A Possible-Worlds Solution to the Puzzle of Petitionary Prayer by Parker, Ryan Matthew & Rettler, Bradley
PP. 179–186 EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR 
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 
Vol 9, No 1 (2017) 
DOI: 10.24204/EJPR.V9I1.1856
A POSSIBLE-WORLDS SOLUTION TO THE 
PUZZLE OF PETITIONARY PRAYER
RYAN M. PARKER AND BRADLEY RETTLER
Baylor University
Abstract.1 If the thing he prays for doesn’t happen, then that is one more 
proof that petitionary prayers don’t work; if it does happen, he will, of course, 
be able to see some of the physical causes which led up to it, and ‘therefore 
it would have happened anyway’, and thus a granted prayer becomes just 
as good a proof as a denied one that prayers are ineffective.   
C.S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a familiar puzzle in the philosophy of religion regarding peti-
tionary prayer.2 Start by assuming the traditional divine attributes — omnis-
cience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness. Then ask what kind of actions 
God performs. Presumably the very best ones he can, because of his perfect 
goodness. He knows which actions are the very best ones he can perform, 
because of his omniscience. And he can perform those actions, because of 
his omnipotence. Continue by assuming that we human persons lack those 
1 Division of labor footnote: The main idea and the power plant illustration was Ry-
an’s, and the possible worlds framework was Bradley’s.
2 See Aquinas (1274), Stump (1979), and Basinger (1983).
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traditional divine attributes; we are neither omniscient nor omnipotent nor 
perfectly good.
But sometimes we ask God to do something. And when asking, we as-
sume that our asking will have some effect on God’s decision to perform the 
action. But it’s hard to square that with the above. Formally:
(1) For any action A, either God ought to do A or God ought not to 
do A.
(2) For any action A, if God ought to do A, then God knows that God 
ought to do A and God will do A.
(3) For any action A, if God ought not to do A, then God knows that 
God ought not to do A and God will not do A.
(4) For any action A, if God knows that God ought to do A and God 
will do A, then your asking God to do A has no effect on whether 
God does A.
(5) For any action A, if God knows that God ought not to do A and 
God will not do A, then your asking God to do A has no effect on 
whether God does A.
(6) Therefore, for any action A, your asking God to do A has no effect 
on whether God does A.
There are various responses in the literature. We are dissatisfied with 
them, and in this paper, we offer a new one.
II. THE OLD RESPONSES
There are several responses that locate the worth of petitionary prayer 
in something other than its effectiveness in prompting God to act. One such 
response is that prayer is good for those who pray, to align their desires with 
God’s, or to be more aware of God’s ability to act in the world.3 Another says 
they are good for God, because God appreciates creation asking for things.4 
3 See Murray and Meyers (1994) and Davison (2011).
4 See Aquinas (1274) II, Q83, 2.
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Another says they are good for both us and God (but mostly us), because they 
improve our relationship.5 Yet another says that petitionary prayer is good 
because there is an implicit vow of partnership between the petitioner and 
God, and it is a better world when God responds to the prayers where such 
vows are made (more sincere or intense vows are more likely to be recognized 
and rewarded by God).6 These may very well be true, but they do not show 
that prayer is effective in influencing God’s actions. We hope for something 
stronger.
Dan and Frances Howard-Snyder give two responses that maintain the 
effectiveness of petitionary prayer.7 The first response is that sometimes it’s 
better for God to do something in response to a request than it is for God to 
do the same thing on his own. They give an example of a child who likes spi-
ders. They’ve purchased many spider books for the child, and are considering 
purchasing another one. They decide it would be better to show the child the 
books and give him the opportunity to take some initiative in his intellectual 
pursuits. Similarly, God might wait until someone asks him to do something 
so that he can respond to the request because it’s better for the person; they 
recognize their need for God’s help, and get more comfortable asking for it.
The second response the Howard-Snyders give is that being asked to do 
something can change the moral landscape. If you see me by the side of the 
road, you may stop to offer me a ride, or you may drive on. You’re not morally 
obligated to stop. But once I start waving my arms and running after you, it 
gives you a reason to stop. There may still be countervailing reasons to you 
stopping, but they have to be more weighty than my request. Similarly, when 
we ask God to do something, that gives him reason to do it.8 It’s a factor that 
he considers when deciding whether or not to do A.
We dislike the first response because either it doesn’t work, or it collaps-
es to the second response. Either doing something in response to a request 
changes the moral landscape, giving one a more moral reason to do some-
thing, or it doesn’t. If it does, then the first response collapses to the second. 
If it doesn’t, then God will do whatever God’s going to do, regardless of the 
5 See Stump (1979).
6 See Smith and Yip (2010).
7 See Howard-Snyder (2010).
8 Gellman (1987) advocates a similar response to the puzzle.
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request. The action may be made better by the request, but the request won’t 
change whether or not it is performed, and therefore will have no effect.
We dislike the second response because it will apply in too narrow a range 
of cases. If asking does give God a more moral reason to act, it doesn’t give 
him much of one. It is difficult to imagine that a significant request for God 
to act has such a moral effect that he grants the request, instead of acting 
as he already intended to. Recall that this effect is specifically the good that 
comes just from the request being granted, not what comes from the event that 
is requested. Suppose someone asks God to cure her father’s cancer. There 
are a great many goods that will accompany that removal, for her family and 
people outside it. Perhaps there are also some bad things – if there weren’t, 
then presumably God would cure it. So in the scope of all those goods and 
evils, how much good does her asking allow for? We can’t see that it would be 
much. So this response allows for our prayers for small things to be effective, 
since there isn’t much good or evil on each side, but not big things. It’s reason-
able to pray that I find my keys quickly, or a parking spot, but not that a friend 
survives or that my child is healthy.
III. OUR RESPONSE
We’ll present our response using the heuristic of possible worlds. The 
problem of the effectiveness of petitionary prayer assumes that God always 
has to do what’s best; if he didn’t, then our prayers could be effective in that 
they dissuade God from performing the best action. The simplest way to 
think of this is to think that God has to actualize the best possible world. If 
there is more than one world that’s tied for the best, God has to actualize one 
of them. And if there is no best world because there’s an infinite chain of bet-
ter worlds, God has to actualize one of the really good ones (this is purely for 
simplicity, and can be jettisoned and the solution recast in terms of individual 
actions). So, the problem has it that God has already decided which world 
to actualize — either the best, one of the best, or a really good one. Our ask-
ing him to do something is either a part of that world that God will choose, 
or not. If it is, our prayers are ineffective because he already knows the best 
world to choose. If our request isn’t part of the best world, our prayers will be 
unable to keep God from choosing the best world. So much for background.
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Here’s our solution. Our prayers that God perform an action A are ef-
fective if there are two worlds that are equally good: one in which God does 
A, and one in which God doesn’t do A. When we ask God to perform A, we 
assume that there’s some A-world that God would actualize. That’s either be-
cause the best world is an A-world, because there’s an A-world that’s as good 
as any non-A-world, or because there’s an A-world above the threshold of 
goodness for God to actualize.
In the first case, our prayers are ineffective; if the best world is an A-
world, then our asking for God to perform A does nothing, because he’s go-
ing to actualize that world anyway. But in the latter two, our prayers may be 
effective. And as long as we don’t know whether the best world is an A-world, 
our prayers are rational, because for all we know, they’ll be effective.
Consider an analogy involving a power plant operator. The operator 
knows that her job is to produce as much power as the plant can, which is, 
say, 3,500 MW per day. She is a capable operator, and will do this. But there 
are many ways to do produce as much power as possible. So if she needs to 
increase steam flow to the turbines (adjust knob A), then she knows she can 
(and must) raise average coolant temperature as well (adjust knob B) in order 
to keep producing 3,500 MW per day. If adjusting knob A by itself would 
cause power to dip below the plant’s limit, and there are no compensating 
actions she can take to maintain the power level, then she won’t adjust knob 
A. Adjusting knob A is possible for the operator because knob B can be ad-
justed to maintain her objective of max power. The power plant operator is 
analogous to God. God can grant our request to actualize an A-world and 
still maintain the objective of his creation by making adjustments elsewhere.
If there are multiple worlds that are tied for the best, our prayers are ef-
fective. When we ask God to perform A, we are hoping that one of the worlds 
that’s tied for the best is a world in which God performs A. But we also are 
thinking that there might be a world that’s tied for the best in which God 
doesn’t perform A, and we think he might be intending to actualize that 
world. We know that he has to actualize one of the best worlds, but if two are 
tied then he can pick either, then we encourage him to pick the one in which 
he performs A.
If there is no best world, just an infinite chain of slightly better worlds, our 
prayers are still effective. In this case, there presumably is a “goodness line’’ 
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such that God can permissibly actualize any world above that line. When we 
ask God to perform A, we are hoping that one of the worlds above the line 
is one in which God performs A. But, we also are thinking that there might 
be worlds above that line in which God doesn’t perform A, and we think he 
might be intending to actualize one of those worlds. We know that he has to 
actualize a world above the line, but he can pick any of them, and we encour-
age him to pick one in which he performs A.
This is where our analogy is relevant. The operator can tweak the dials in 
a variety of ways – there are a variety of dial-setting combinations – to pro-
duce the maximum power per day. Suppose we request that the turbines be 
slowed 10%. In that case, we are hoping that one of the sets of dial values that 
will produce the maximum amount of power corresponding to those turbine 
values. And we know that there are sets of dial values that will produce the 
maximum amount of power where the turbines are faster, and we think the 
power plant operator might be intending to use those dial settings. We know 
that she has to make as much power as she can, but if faster turbine settings 
and slower turbine settings allow for the same amount of power, other rel-
evant values being changed, then she can slow down the turbines in response 
to my request.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
Objection: When we encourage God to pick an A-world over a non-A-
world, we assume that if there is an A-world as good as any non-A-world, he 
will grant our request. But sometimes, it seems, we can just see that there is 
an A-world that’s as good as any non-A-world, and we pray that God perform 
A, and yet God does not. So, our prayers are ineffective.
Reply 1: We have not said that all petitionary prayers are effective, or that 
the majority are, or that all or most prayers where the goodness of the worlds 
in which they’re granted versus not granted are tied are effective. We’re re-
sponding to an argument that petitionary prayer is never effective, because 
the notion is incoherent. We’ve given situations where prayers can be effective 
without inconsistency.
Reply 2: But if we wanted to say that God grants all prayers to A when an 
A-world is as good as any non-A-world, we would say that, contrary to the 
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way it seems, if we pray that God perform A and he doesn’t, then there is a 
non-A-world that’s better than every A-world. That’s the only reason God 
denies prayers.
Reply 3: But if we concede that there is an A-world that’s as good as any 
non-A-world, and we pray that God perform A, and yet God does not, then it 
must be because more people prayed that God not perform A.
Objection: So sometimes God grants requests, and sometimes God de-
nies requests. We must explain the difference between the times he grants the 
requests and the times he denies them. If he grants them, then he has some 
reason for granting them. If he denies them, then he has some reason for 
denying them. So he grants or denies our prayers for those reasons, and not 
because of our prayers. So our prayers are ineffective after all.
Reply: Sometimes God is ambivalent between world X (where he per-
forms A) and world Y (where he performs B), because both are equally as 
good or could be made equally as good. But sometimes he is not, because one 
of the worlds is better. When God denies our prayers that he perform A, it’s 
because he can’t make any A-world as good as the best non-A-world. And he 
denies our prayers for that reason. When the worlds are tied, he has to just 
pick one. And our prayers influence which one he picks.
CONCLUSION
There is a persuasive argument that an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly 
good God cannot respond to petitionary prayer, because God has already 
decided what to do. There are some responses to this argument, but they don’t 
allow us to pray for important things. We have offered a response whereby all 
of our petitionary prayers are reasonable, as long as we think that: (i) what 
we’re asking God to do is part of a world that God could create, (ii) there’s 
some other world God could create such that what we’re asking God to do 
fails to be part of that world, (iii) God might be intending to create a world in 
which he doesn’t do what we’re asking, and (iv) our asking God might cause 
him to actualize a world in which he does what we’re asking. Our petitionary 
prayers can be effective if (i)-(iv) is true.
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